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TAXATION
Craig D. Bell *
Michael H. Brady **
INTRODUCTION
This article reviews significant recent developments in the laws
affecting Virginia state and local taxation. Its sections cover legislative activity, judicial decisions, and selected opinions or pronouncements from the Virginia Department of Taxation and the
Attorney General of Virginia over the past year.
Part I of this article addresses state taxes. Part II covers local
taxes, including real and tangible personal property taxes, license
taxes, recordation tax, and administrative local tax procedures.
The overall purpose of this article is to provide Virginia tax and
general practitioners with a concise overview of the recent developments in Virginia taxation that will most likely impact them.
However, it does not address many of the numerous technical leg-
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School of Law, College of William & Mary; J.D., 1983, State University of New York at Buffalo; M.B.A., 1980, Syracuse University; B.S., 1979, Syracuse University.
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islative changes to title 58.1 of the Virginia Code, which covers taxation.
I. TAXES ADMINISTERED BY THE VIRGINIA TAX DEPARTMENT
A. Significant Legislative Activity
1. Fixed Date of Conformity with Internal Revenue Code
As in years past, the Virginia General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 58.1-301, the provision mandating conformity
with the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) as of a certain date, to February 9, 2018 from December 31, 2016. 1 This advancement allows
Virginia to fully conform to the Disaster Tax Relief and Airport and
Airway Extension Act of 2017 (“Disaster Relief Act”), 2 certain limited portions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (“2017 Tax Act”) 3
and provisions of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 4 other than
those that affect only the 2017 taxable year. 5
The most significant effect of Virginia’s conformity with the Disaster Relief Act is the suspension of limitations imposed on charitable contribution deductions for 2017 hurricane relief efforts. 6 Although there were other provisions of the 2017 Tax Act that
Virginia elected to conform to, 7 the most effectual change to Virginia tax law was a reduction of the threshold over which medical
expenses may be deducted from 10% of adjusted gross income to
7.5%. 8

1. Act of Feb. 23, 2018, ch. 15, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-301 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
2. Disaster Tax Relief and Airport and Airway Extension Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 11563, 131 Stat. 1168 (2017).
3. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
4. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 64 (2018).
5. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-301(B)(7) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
6. Section 504 of the Disaster Relief Act temporarily exempted charitable contributions “made for relief efforts in the Hurricane Harvey disaster area, the Hurricane Irma
disaster area, or the Hurricane Maria disaster area” from the limitations on charitable deductions imposed by 26 U.S.C. §§ 68 and 170. See Disaster Tax Relief and Airport and Airway Extension Act § 504(2)(4)(A)(i)(II), 131 Stat. at 1182.
7. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-301(B)(6)(a)–(b) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
8. See id. § 58.1-301(B)(6)(c) (Cum. Supp. 2018) (exempting from non-conformity with
the 2017 Tax Act “the temporary reduction in the medical expense deduction floor pursuant
to § 11027 of the Act”). Section 11027 of the 2017 Tax Act temporarily amended 26 U.S.C. §
213(f) to decrease the threshold for this itemized deduction. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11027,
131 Stat. at 2077.
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As has been the case for many years, Virginia still does not conform to a number of federal tax provisions, including the “special
depreciation allowance for certain property provided for under
[IRC sections] 168(k), 168(l), 168(m), 1400L, and 1400N,” 9 the fiveyear carry-back period for “certain net operating losses under” IRC
section 172(b)(1)(H), 10 and the income tax deductions related to
“applicable high yield discount obligations” under IRC section
163(e)(5)(F). 11 Virginia tax law also continues to disallow the income tax deductions related to the deferral of certain income from
the debt cancellation under IRC section 108(i),
unless the taxpayer elects to include such income in the taxpayer’s
Virginia taxable income ratably over a three-taxable-year period beginning with taxable year 2009 for transactions completed in taxable
year 2009, or over a three-taxable-year period beginning with taxable
year 2010 for transactions completed in taxable year 2010 on or before
April 21, 2010. 12

2. Income Taxation: Apportionment Formula Changes for
Certain Businesses
a. Apportionment Formula Modifications for New Businesses
Creating Jobs
The theme of changing corporate taxation in order to stimulate
job creation and investment found expression in the Virginia General Assembly. In 2018, the legislature adopted a law 13 that authorizes certain “eligible compan[ies]”—out-of-state companies
with no prior property or payroll in the Commonwealth 14 who invest capital and/or create jobs in certain less populous counties
(“qualified localit[ies]”) 15 over the next six years—to elect a modified apportionment of the companies’ Virginia taxable income. 16

9. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-301(B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
10. Id. § 58.1-301(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
11. Id. § 58.1-301(B)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
12. Id. § 58.1-301(B)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
13. Act of Apr. 9, 2018, ch. 801, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.2-115 (Cum. Supp. 2018); id. §§ 58.1-405, -408, -417 to -20, -422.1, -422.2 (Cum.
Supp. 2018); codified at id. § 15.2-958.2:01 (Cum. Supp. 2018); id. § 58.1-405.1 (Cum. Supp.
2018)).
14. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-405.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2018) (defining “[t]raded-sector
company”).
15. Id. (listing the localities which qualify under this section).
16. Id. § 58.1-405 (Cum. Supp. 2018).
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To become an eligible company, the qualified investment must
be a new acquisition of real property or improvements to real property worth at least $5 million and in a qualified locality. 17 The qualifying jobs are new jobs of a permanent, full-time nature that pay
time and a half the minimum wage. 18 Having made a qualified investment, a company can become eligible if it also creates ten qualifying jobs; without a qualifying investment, the company must
create fifty or more qualifying jobs to become eligible. 19 Eligibility
must be certified. 20 Corporate restructuring in order to claim this
benefit will not be honored. 21
For an eligible company that elects multifactor apportionment,
the company may subtract from the numerator in that formula
that part of the company’s property connected to the qualifying investment, its payroll in qualified localities, and all of its sales in
Virginia during that taxable year. 22 Eligible companies that elect
single-factor apportionment of their Virginia taxable income are
authorized to subtract some portion of the numerator connected to
their taxable activity or property that occurs or is located in the
qualified locality, depending on the industry. 23 There are specific
provisions for those eligible companies that are motor carriers, 24

17. Id. § 58.1-405.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2018) (defining “[n]ew capital investment”).
18. See id. (defining “[n]ew job”).
19. Id. (defining “eligible compan[ies]” as those corporations or pass-through entities
that do “not have any existing property or payroll in Virginia as of January 1, 2018, and on
or after January 1, 2018, but before January 1, 2025, (i) either (a) spends at least $5 million
on new capital investment in a qualified locality or qualified localities and creates at least
10 new jobs in a qualified locality or qualified localities or (b) creates at least 50 new jobs in
a qualified locality or qualified localities; (ii) is a traded-sector company; and (iii) is certified
by the Authority as generating a positive fiscal impact pursuant to subsection B” of that
section).
20. Id. § 58.1-405.1(A)–(B) (Cum. Supp. 2018). The Virginia Economic Development
Partnership Authority has been directed to issue guidelines regarding the certification process. See Act of Apr. 9, 2018, ch. 801, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.2-115(F)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-405.1(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
22. Id. § 58.1-408(B) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
23. Id.
24. Id. § 58.1-417(C) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
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financial corporations, 25 construction corporations, 26 railway companies, 27 manufacturing companies, 28 retail companies, 29 or taxpayers with enterprise data center operations. 30 The Department
of Taxation has been directed to promulgate guidelines regarding
these modifications to the apportionment formulae. 31 Modifications to Virginia taxable income resulting from reliance upon these
provisions must be included and detailed with the taxpayer’s return. 32
b. Single Sales Factor Apportionment of Corporate Income for
Debt Buyers
Besides amending apportionment formulas for eligible companies that create new jobs and invest in Virginia, the General Assembly also adopted several amendments to existing Virginia Code
sections, and added a new Virginia Code section, addressing apportionment of Virginia taxable income for “debt buyers.” 33 A “debt
buyer” is defined as “an entity and its affiliated entities that purchase nonperforming loans from unaffiliated commercial entities
that (i) are in default for at least 120 days or (ii) are in bankruptcy
proceedings”; this does not include third-party debt collectors. 34
Under this new legislation, debt buyers are excluded from the general statutory method of multifactor apportionment applicable to
corporate income for taxable year 2019 forward.
Instead, debt buyers’ Virginia taxable income, excluding income
allocable under Virginia Code section 58.1-407, is multiplied only
by the sales factor. 35 Significantly, the ordinary rule for whether a
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. § 58.1-418(D) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
Id. § 58.1-419(C) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
Id. § 58.1-420(B) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
Id. § 58.1-422(F) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
Id. § 58.1-422.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
Id. § 58.1-422.2(E) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
See Act of Apr. 9, 2018, ch. 801, 2018 Va. Acts __, __.
See id. ch. 801, 2018 Va. Acts at __.
See Act of Apr. 9, 2018, ch. 807, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-408, -416 (Cum. Supp. 2018); codified at id. § 58.1-422.3 (Cum. Supp.
2018)).
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-422.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
35. Id. § 58.1-422.3(B) (Cum. Supp. 2018). The sales factor “is a fraction, the numerator
of which is the total sales of the corporation in the Commonwealth during the taxable year,
and the denominator of which is the total sales of the corporation everywhere during the
taxable year, to the extent that such sales are used to produce Virginia taxable income and
are effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States
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sale of other than tangible personal property is included in the numerator of the sales factor—whether the “income-producing activity is performed in the Commonwealth” or whether the greater cost
of performing the income-producing activity is performed in the
Commonwealth 36—has been superseded for debt buyers. For debt
buyers, sales are deemed to be in the Commonwealth only if the
sales “consist of money recovered on debt that a debt buyer collected from a person who is a resident of the Commonwealth or an
entity that has its commercial domicile in the Commonwealth,” regardless of where the debt buyer is located and the income producing activity is performed. 37
Under this legislation, a multistate debt buyer based in Virginia
with significant collections from debtors across the United States
would have a relatively smaller sales factor and, presumably, a
smaller total apportionment factor. In comparison, similar debt
buyers based outside the Commonwealth may have a relatively
larger sales factor and total apportionment formula.
The Tax Commissioner and Department of Taxation are directed
to vigorously enforce this apportionment formula for debt buyers
and “assert the taxpayer’s nexus with the Commonwealth to the
maximum extent permitted under the Constitutions of Virginia
and the United States and federal law.” 38 The Department of Taxation is directed to “develop and make publicly available guidelines
implementing the provisions of this act,” and to “cooperate with
and seek the counsel of interested groups,” including via “a public
hearing” prior to promulgating any guidelines. 39 Preliminary
guidelines are required by the end of 2018, final guidelines by the
end of 2019, and updated guidelines by the end of 2021. 40

and income therefrom is includable in federal taxable income.” Id. § 58.1-414 (Repl. Vol.
2017).
36. See id. § 58.1-416(A) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
37. Id. § 58.1-416(B) (Cum. Supp. 2018). The debt buyer taxpayer may use a reasonable
estimate, reached in good faith and not for the principal purpose of avoiding taxes, of the
dollar value and portion of its sales in the Commonwealth where necessary information is
not available. Id. § 58.1-416(D) (Cum. Supp. 2018). The Department of Taxation must ultimately conclude that the estimate satisfies these criteria. Id.
38. Id. § 58.1-416(C) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
39. Act of Apr. 9, 2018, ch. 807, 2018 Va. Acts __, __.
40. See id. ch. 807, 2018 Va. Acts at __.
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c. Credits and Deductions Against Income Taxation: Tax Credit
for Coal and Coalbed Methane Mined Revived and Revised
Besides changes to the amount of taxable income to be reported,
the General Assembly in 2018 also revived a preexisting tax credit
program applicable to some coal and coalbed methane extraction,
the Coalfield Employment Enhancement Tax Credit. 41 For taxable
years 2018 through 2022, persons with “an economic interest 42 in
coal mined in the Commonwealth shall be allowed a credit against”
state taxes, including corporate income tax, of certain amounts for
tons of metallurgical coal mined 43 and for millions of British Thermal Units (“BTUs”) of coalbed methane produced in the Commonwealth. 44 The limitation on metallurgical coal revises the pre-existing tax credit program. 45
As before, the amount of the credit varies by method of extraction: more per ton of coal mined by underground methods, 46 and
still more for coal mined underground from seams of thirty-six
inches or less, 47 but less per ton of coal mined using surface mining
methods. 48 As under the earlier tax credit program, the thickness
of the coal seam must be certified by a professional engineer and
copies of such certification must be maintained by the taxpayer
claiming the credit. 49
Similarly, this revived tax credit cannot be claimed until “the
third taxable year following the taxable year in which the credit
was earned and allowed.” 50 As a result, no credits can be claimed

41. Act of May 18, 2018, ch. 855, 2018 Va. Acts __, __.
42. This economic interest “is the same as the economic ownership interest required by
§ 611 of the Internal Revenue Code which was in effect on December 31, 1977”; one “who
only receives an arm’s length royalty” lacks an economic interest in coal. VA. CODE ANN. §
58.1-439.2(C) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
43. Id. § 58.1-439.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2018). Subsection (H) provides the definition of
“metallurgical coal.” Id. § 58.1-439.2(H) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
44. Id. § 58.1-439.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2018) (allowing “a credit in the amount of one cent
($0.01) per million BTUs of coalbed methane produced in the Commonwealth”).
45. See, e.g., id. § 58.1-439.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2016) (making no distinction between
types of coal “mined by underground methods”).
46. Id. § 58.1-439.2(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2018) (allowing a $1.00 credit per ton of metallurgical coal mined from seams thicker than thirty-six inches).
47. Id. (allowing a $2.00 credit per ton of metallurgical coal mined from seams less than
thirty-six inches thick).
48. Id. § 58.1-439.2(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2018) (allowing “a credit in the amount of 40
cents ($0.40) per ton for coal sold in 1996, and each year thereafter”).
49. Id. § 58.1-439.2(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2016 & Cum. Supp. 2018).
50. Id. § 58.1-439.2(G) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
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until taxable year 2021. The Department of Taxation is directed to
“develop and make publicly available guidelines implementing the
provisions of this act.” 51
d. Corporate Agricultural Best Management Practices Tax
Credit Made Refundable
Since 1998, corporations “engaged in agricultural production for
market[s] who ha[ve] in place a soil conservation plan approved by
the local Soil and Water Conservation District” could claim credits
against their Virginia corporate tax liability in “an amount equaling twenty-five percent of the first $70,000 expended for agricultural best management practices by the corporation.” 52 In effect
antipollution measures, these agricultural best management practices are those “practice[s] approved by the Virginia Soil and Water
Conservation Board (VSWCB) which will provide a significant improvement to water quality in the state’s streams and rivers and
the Chesapeake Bay and [are] consistent with other state and federal programs that address agricultural, nonpoint-source-pollution
management.” 53
Under prior law, the tax credits could be “carried over for credit
against income taxes in the next five taxable years until the total
amount of the tax credit has been taken.” 54 By an act of the General
Assembly in 2018, 55 if a corporation has excess credits from expenditures on an agricultural best management practice, “the excess shall be refunded by the Tax Commissioner . . . . on behalf of
the Commonwealth for 100 percent of face value . . . . [and] within
90 days after the filing date of the income tax return on which the
taxpayer applies for the refund.” 56 Accordingly, corporations can
now claim a refund on equal terms as a noncorporation. 57

51. Act of May 18, 2018, ch. 855, 2018 Va. Acts __, __.
52. Act of Apr. 5, 1996, ch. 629, 1996 Va. Acts 1096, 1097 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
58.1-339.2, -439.4(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996)).
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.5(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
54. Id. § 58.1-439.5(C) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
55. Act of Mar. 30, 2018, ch. 556, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-439.5 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.5(C)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
57. See id. § 58.1-339.3(C)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
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e. Land Preservation Tax Credit Transferrable on Death
Virginia law affords substantial, nonrefundable tax credits
against Virginia income tax liability, presently in an amount equal
to “40 percent of the fair market value of the land or interest in
land” “located in Virginia” that
is conveyed for the purpose of agricultural and forestal use, open
space, natural resource, and/or biodiversity conservation, or land, agricultural, watershed and/or historic preservation, as an unconditional donation by the landowner/taxpayer to a public or private conservation agency eligible to hold such land and interests therein for
conservation or preservation purposes. 58

Only so many of the credits may be taken in any one year, in no
case more than $100,000, and then never more than “the amount
of individual, fiduciary or corporate income tax otherwise due.” 59
Unused credits may be carried over for ten years “following the
taxable year in which the credit originated until fully expended” or
as many as thirteen years for credits that originated in taxable
years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2015, and thereafter. 60 Besides carrying
over such credits, the taxpayer can also “transfer unused but otherwise allowable credit for use by another taxpayer on Virginia income tax returns,” subject to a transfer fee. 61
Under the 2018 amendment to Virginia Code section 58.1-513, 62
an individual taxpayer can also “provide through a will, bequest,
or other instrument of transfer that, upon his death, his unused
credit shall be transferred to a designated beneficiary.” 63 And, in
the absence of a will, such unused credits will pass as part of the
estate under the rules of intestate succession. 64 This provision applies to all such transfers of credits on or after July 1, 2018, “regardless of when such unused credits were earned.” 65 However,
note that the timeline for usage of the credits is not extended or

58. Id. § 58.1-512(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
59. Id. § 58.1-512(C)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
60. Id.
61. Id. § 58.1-513(C)(1)–(2) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
62. Act of Mar. 30, 2018, ch. 560, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-513 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-513(C)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
64. Id.
65. Ch. 560, 2018 Va. Acts at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-513
(Cum. Supp. 2018)).
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otherwise affected by transfer of the credits as a bequest or via intestacy. 66
f.

Worker Retraining Tax Credit Expansion for Manufacturers

Virginia Code section 58.1-439.6(B) provides that an employer
can claim “30 percent of all expenditures paid or incurred by the
employer during the taxable year for eligible worker retraining.” 67
Only expenditures paid or incurred to retrain employees “in a fulltime position requiring a minimum of 1,680 hours in the entire
normal year of the employer’s operations if the standard fringe
benefits are paid by the employer for the employee” can generate
any credits. 68
Under amended and reenacted Virginia Code section 58.1439.6(B), 69 the General Assembly expanded the scope of the
Worker Retraining Tax Credit for certain businesses, offering up
to $2000 in tax credits against individual or corporate income tax
liability for expenditures on courses provided to junior high and
high school students. 70 The credit, however, is not limited to assembly-line-style manufacturing, but extends to all businesses
who are primarily engaged in “processing, manufacturing, refining, mining, or converting products for sale or resale.” 71
The tax credit is earned for “direct costs incurred . . . in conducting orientation, instruction, and training in the Commonwealth relating to the manufacturing activities undertaken by the business,”
and at a rate of 35% for every dollar. 72 Instead of limiting the credit
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-513(C)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
67. Id. § 58.1-439.6(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017). “Eligible worker retraining” is defined as “retraining of a qualified employee that promotes economic development in the form of (i) noncredit courses at any of the Commonwealth’s comprehensive community colleges or a private
school or (ii) worker retraining programs undertaken through an apprenticeship agreement
approved by the Commissioner of Labor and Industry.” Id. § 58.1-439.6(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
68. Id. § 58.1-439.6(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017) (defining “qualified employee”).
69. Act of Mar. 29, 2018, ch. 500, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-439.6 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.6(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
71. Id. (authorizing a credit to a “business primarily engaged in manufacturing”); id. §
58.1-439.6(A) (Cum. Supp. 2018) (defining “manufacturing” to mean “processing, manufacturing, refining, mining, or converting products for sale or resale”).
72. Id. § 58.1-439.6(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2018). “Direct costs” are limited to
the following expenditures: (a) salaries or wages paid to instructors and trainers, prorated for the period of instruction or training; (b) costs for orientation,
instruction, and training materials; (c) amounts paid for machinery and equipment used primarily for such instruction and training; and (d) the cost of leased
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to retraining of current full-time employees, as under prior law,
new subsection (B)(2) authorizes credits to be awarded
for programs that (i) provide orientation, instruction, and training
solely to students in grades six through 12; (ii) are coordinated with
the local school division; and (iii) are conducted either at a plant or
facility owned, leased, rented, or otherwise used by the business or at
a public middle or high school in Virginia. 73

The “orientation, instruction, and training program” must be
“approved by the local school division and certified as eligible by
the Virginia Economic Development Partnership Authority” in order to generate any credits. 74 And it remains the case that “any
program operated, administered, or paid for by the Commonwealth” cannot be the basis for claiming any credit under either
subsection (B)(1) or new subsection (B)(2). 75 Only $1 million in total tax credits, whether for worker retraining under subsection
(B)(1) or student training by manufacturers under subsection
(B)(2), may be issued by the Department of Taxation in any taxable
year, 76 a reduction of $1.5 million from prior law. 77
g. Green Job Creation Tax Credit Extended
The General Assembly, in 2010, created a tax credit against individual or corporate income tax liability “for each new green job
created within the Commonwealth by the taxpayer,” in the amount
of $500 per job, provided the annual salary for such job was $50,000
or more. 78 The credit was slated to sunset at the end of 2014. 79 Back

or rented space used primarily for conducting the program.
Id.
73. Compare id. § 58.1-439.6(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2018), with id. § 58.1-439.6(A) (Repl.
Vol. 2017).
74. Id. § 58.1-439.6(D)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
75. Compare id. § 58.1-439.6(F) (Cum. Supp. 2018), with id. § 58.1-439.6(F) (Repl. Vol.
2017).
76. Id. § 58.1-439.6(B)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
77. See id. § 58.1-439.6(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017). The Department of Taxation’s Fiscal Impact Statement to House Bill 129 noted, however, that under prior law, no more than
$235,000 in credits had been issued in any fiscal year from 2012 through 2017. VA. DEP’T
OF TAXATION, 2018 FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT: H.B. 129 (Jan. 16, 2018), https://lis.virginia.
gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?181+oth+HB129F161+PDF.
78. Act of Apr. 13, 2010, chs. 722, 727, 2010 Va. Acts 1306, 1314 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-439.12:05 (Cum. Supp. 2010)). For more on the statutory program enacted, see
Craig D. Bell, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Taxation, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 377, 380–81
(2010).
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.12:05(A) (Cum. Supp. 2011).
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in 2015, the green-jobs tax credit was extended through 2017. 80
This year, the General Assembly extended it further, through
2020. 81
h. Deduction for Investment Income from Virginia REITs
In 2018, the General Assembly adopted other provisions designed to incentivize investment in Virginia, including allowing
otherwise-taxable income, whether individual or corporate, to be
deducted if resulting from certain investments in Virginia’s lessaffluent localities. 82 Amended and reenacted Virginia Code sections 58.1-322.02 and 58.1-402 provide that income attributable to
an investment made during the period of 2019 through 2024 in certain real estate investment trusts (“REITs”) 83 may be deducted
from Virginia taxable income for purposes of individual 84 or corporate taxation. 85
For the deduction from income to be allowed, the Department of
Taxation must certify the REIT as a Virginia REIT. 86 To be so certified, the REIT must register with the Department of Taxation
prior to the end of 2024, indicate its intent “to invest at least 90
percent of trust funds in Virginia and at least 40 percent of trust
funds in real estate in localities that are distressed or double distressed,” and be found to have carried out that intent by the Department of Taxation. 87 Localities that are “distressed” or “double
distressed” are defined by certain criteria in Virginia Code sections 2.2-115(E)(2) and (E)(3), respectively, provisions that are part

80. Act of Mar. 23, 2015, ch. 486, 2015 Va. Acts 888, 888–89 (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.12:05(A) (Cum. Supp. 2015)); Act of Mar. 17, 2015, ch. 249, 2015
Va. Acts 461, 461 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.12:05 (Cum. Supp.
2015)).
81. Act of Mar. 19, 2018, ch. 347, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-439.12:05 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
82. Act of Apr. 18, 2018, ch. 821, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 58.1-322.02, -402 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
83. A real estate investment trust is defined by reference to federal law, particularly
I.R.C. § 856 (2012 & Supp. IV 2018). See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-322.02(28)(b), -402(26)(b)
(Cum. Supp. 2018).
84. Id. § 58.1-322.02(28)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
85. Id. § 58.1-402(26)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
86. Id. §§ 58.1-322.02(28)(b), -402(26)(b) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
87. Id.
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of the statutes governing the Commonwealth’s Development Opportunity Fund. 88
The Department of Taxation is directed to develop guidelines
“establishing procedures implementing the provisions of this act
relating to the registration and certification of a real estate investment trust as a Virginia real estate investment trust” by the end
of 2018. 89
i.

Reporting Obligations of Income Tax Return Preparers

In 2017, the Virginia General Assembly adopted an antifraud
provision requiring employers and payroll-service providers to notify the Virginia Attorney General of breaches of taxpayer information that may lead to identity theft or other fraud, and the Virginia Attorney General to notify the Department of Taxation. 90 In
2018, the General Assembly adopted Virginia Code section 58.1341.2, extending this reporting obligation to income tax return preparers and requiring direct notification of the Department of Taxation in the event of breach. 91
In certain circumstances, an “income tax return preparer” 92 who
has “primary responsibility for the overall substantive accuracy of
the preparation of a return or claim for refund”—a “signing income
tax return preparer”—must notify the Department of Taxation
“without unreasonable delay after the discovery or notification of
unauthorized access and acquisition of unencrypted and unredacted return information.” 93 “Return information” involves nonpublic information showing a taxpayer’s identity, i.e.,

88. Id. § 58.1-115(E)(2)–(3) (Repl. Vol. 2017); id. §§ 58.1-322.02(28)(b), -402(26)(b)
(Cum. Supp. 2018).
89. Act of Apr. 18, 2018, ch. 821, 2018 Va. Acts __, __.
90. Act of Mar. 13, 2017, ch. 427, 2017 Va. Acts 677, 678 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
91. Act of Mar. 19, 2018, ch. 360, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1341.2 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
92. This statute incorporates the definition of “[i]ncome tax return preparer” found in
Virginia Code section 58.1-302, which defines it as “any person who prepares for compensation, or who employs one or more persons to prepare for compensation, any return of tax
imposed by this chapter or any claim for refund of tax.” VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-302 (Repl.
Vol. 2017).
93. Id. § 58.1-341.2(A)–(B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
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the name of a person with respect to whom a return is to be filed and
his taxpayer identification number as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 6109, 94
. . . and the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth,
tax liability, tax withheld, assessments, or tax payments. 95

The duty to notify the Department of Taxation is triggered if the
access and acquisition of the return information: (1) “compromises
the confidentiality of such information maintained by such signing
income tax return preparer”; (2) “creates a reasonable belief that
an unencrypted and unredacted version of such information was
accessed and acquired by an unauthorized person”; and (3) “causes,
or such preparer reasonably believes has caused or will cause, identity theft or other fraud.” 96
If the duty to notify arises, the signing income tax return preparer must “provide the Department with the name and taxpayer
identification number of any taxpayer that may be affected” by the
breach “as well as the name of the signing income tax return preparer, his preparer tax identification number, and such other information as the Department may prescribe.” 97 Companies that
provide income tax return preparation must “complete the notice
required by this section on behalf of any of its employees who are
signing income tax preparers and who would otherwise be required
to notify the Department [of Taxation].” 98
3. Sales and Use Taxation: Agricultural Exemption Increased
Virginia law has long exempted a number of agricultural activities from state and local sales and use taxation under Virginia
Code chapter 6 of title 58.1. 99 In 2011, the sale of “[a]gricultural
produce, as defined in § 3.2-4738” (i.e., fruits and vegetables), “and
eggs, as described in § 3.2-5305, raised and sold by an individual
at local farmers markets and roadside stands” was added to the list
of exemptions, but only “when such individual’s annual income
from such sales does not exceed $1,000.” 100 This year the General
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. § 58.1-341.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2018) (defining “[t]axpayer identity”).
Id. (defining “[r]eturn information”).
Id. § 58.1-341.2(B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
Id. § 58.1-341.2(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
Id. § 58.1-341.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
See generally id. § 58.1-609.2 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
Act of Mar. 24, 2011, ch. 466, 2011 Va. Acts 740, 741 (codified as amended at VA.
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Assembly amended Virginia Code section 58.1-609.2 to increase
the amount of the exemption to $2500. 101
B. Significant Judicial Decisions
1. Corporate Income Tax
a. Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc. v. Virginia Department of
Taxation
In this case, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered the subject-to-tax exception of Virginia’s related party intangible expense
add back statute. 102 The majority held that the subject-to-tax exception contained in Virginia Code section 58.1-402(B)(8)(a)(1) “applies only to the extent that the royalty payments were actually
taxed by another state” (i.e., on a post-apportionment basis). 103 The
court stated that the subject-to-tax exception applies as long as
royalties are actually taxed, regardless of which entity paid the tax
(i.e., even if paid by an affiliate, as part of a combined filing or statutory add back). 104 The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the
Richmond City Circuit Court decision and remanded the case for
further proceedings. 105
Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc. (“Kohl’s”) “operates retail stores
throughout the United States, including Virginia”; “Kohl’s Illinois,
Inc. . . . , a corporation organized under the laws of Nevada, is an
affiliate of Kohl’s.” 106 Kohl’s Illinois, Inc. (“Kohl’s Illinois”), does not
operate any retail stores in Virginia. 107 Kohl’s Illinois “owns, manages, and licenses certain intellectual property,” which it licensed
to Kohl’s; pursuant to the license agreement between Kohl’s and
Kohl’s Illinois, Kohl’s paid almost $442 million in royalties to
Kohl’s Illinois during tax year 2009 and almost $482 million during
tax year 2010. 108 When Kohl’s calculated its federal taxable income
CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.2 (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
101. Act of Mar. 19, 2018, ch. 362, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-609.2 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
102. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 295 Va. 177, 810 S.E.2d 891 (2018).
103. Id. at 184, 190, 810 S.E.2d at 896, 899.
104. See id. at 191, 810 S.E.2d at 900.
105. Id. at 191, 810 S.E.2d at 900.
106. Id. at 180, 810 S.E.2d at 894.
107. Id. at 180, 810 S.E.2d at 894.
108. Id. at 180, 810 S.E.2d at 894.
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for 2009 and 2010, “Kohl’s deducted these royalty payments from
its income as an ordinary and necessary business expense under”
section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. 109 In contrast, “Kohl’s
Illinois included the royalties as income in its taxable income calculations.” 110
Kohl’s Illinois wound up not paying state income taxes “on a substantial portion of the royalties.” 111 “Each state in which Kohl’s Illinois filed a [tax] return only taxed an apportionable share of its
taxable income.” 112 Necessarily, this left much of the income generated from royalties untaxed. 113
Virginia is a separate return reporting state. This means that
Kohl’s files a Virginia tax return in Virginia reporting only income
from its Virginia operations. 114 As a separate reporting state, corporate taxpayers calculate their Virginia taxable income by starting with their federal taxable income and then make certain adjustments. 115 One of these adjustments is the requirement to add
back “the amount of any intangible expenses and costs . . . paid” to
their related members “to the extent such expenses were . . . deducted in computing federal taxable income.” 116 The royalty payments paid by Kohl’s to Kohl’s Illinois were “intangible expenses
and costs” paid to a related member, and Kohl’s argued that they
fell “within the ‘subject-to-tax‘ exception to the add back statute.” 117 “This exception provides that the ‘addition shall not be required for any portion of the intangible expenses and costs if . . .
[t]he corresponding item of income received by the related member
is subject to a tax based on or measured by net income or capital
imposed by . . . another state.’” 118
On cross-motions for summary judgment on a fully stipulated
case, the Richmond City Circuit Court held that, because Kohl’s
royalty payments to Kohl’s Illinois were not actually taxed in other

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
2017)).

Id. at 180, 810 S.E.2d at 894.
Id. at 180, 810 S.E.2d at 894.
Id. at 180, 810 S.E.2d at 894.
Id. at 180–81, 810 S.E.2d at 894.
See id. at 181, 810 S.E.2d at 894.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-400 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
Id. § 58.1-402(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
Id. § 58.1-402(B)(8)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
Kohl’s, 295 Va. 182, 810 S.E.2d at 895.
Id. at 182, 810 S.E.2d at 895 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-402(B)(8)(a) (Repl. Vol.
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states, the add back exception contained in Virginia Code section
58.1-402(B)(8)(a)(1) did not apply. 119 The court granted the Tax Department’s motion for summary judgment and denied Kohl’s motion. 120
The arguments made by the parties before the Supreme Court
of Virginia were largely the same as those argued at the trial court.
Kohl’s argued the subject-to-tax exception provides that royalties
paid to a related member that were subject to a tax in another state
are not added back if that state imposes a tax that is “based on or
measured by net income” or capital. 121 Under Kohl’s argument, all
of the royalties fell within the subject-to-tax exception because they
were all included in the taxable income of Kohl’s Illinois. In Kohl’s
view, if the royalty fee “income is included in the computation of a
corporation’s taxable income in another state, then it is ‘subject to
a tax based on or measured by net income.’” 122
The Department of Taxation countered by arguing that “while
all of the royalties were included in the taxable income of Kohl’s
Illinois, a substantial portion of these royalties was not attributable to any state in which Kohl’s Illinois filed its returns and, as a
result, not subject to a tax imposed by another state.” 123 In other
words, the Supreme Court of Virginia noted, “Kohl’s argue[d] that
the subject-to-tax exception applie[d] on a ‘pre-apportionment’ basis, while the Department [of Taxation] argue[d] that the subjectto-tax exception applie[d] on a ‘post-apportionment’ basis.” 124
The Supreme Court of Virginia began its review by examining
the plain language of Virginia Code section 58.1-402(B)(8). The
court found the statute’s language ambiguous, holding that “looking only at the plain language of the statute, it is doubtful and uncertain whether the General Assembly intended the subject-to-tax
exception to apply on a pre or postapportionment basis.” 125 The

119. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 91 Va. Cir. 499, 504–06 (2016)
(Richmond City); see Craig D. Bell, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Taxation, 51 U. RICH. L.
REV. 103, 112–13 (2016) (discussing the trial court’s decision).
120. Kohl’s, 91 Va. Cir. at 506.
121. Kohl’s, 295 Va. at 185, 810 S.E.2d at 896.
122. Id. at 185, 810 S.E.2d at 896 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-402(B)(8)(a)(1) (Repl.
Vol. 2017)).
123. Id. at 185, 810 S.E.2d at 896.
124. Id. at 185, 810 S.E.2d at 896.
125. Id. at 187, 810 S.E.2d at 897.
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term “subject-to-tax” is not defined by the Virginia Tax Code. 126
The Supreme Court of Virginia then examined the legislative history of Virginia Code section 58.1-402(B)(8) in an attempt to determine the legislature’s intent in enacting the statute. The court
found that by enacting the add back statute, Virginia had “joined
numerous states with legislation ‘designed primarily to prevent
the deduction of royalties and interest paid to related intangible
holding companies.’” 127 Based on this history, the court found that
“[u]nder a pre-apportionment interpretation,” as advocated by
Kohl’s, “[a] corporation[] could avoid application of the add back
statute by paying royalties to a related member in a state in which
its apportionment factor is insignificant.” 128 Such a result, the
court concluded, would “resurrect the loophole” that the add back
statute was designed to close. 129 Therefore, the court held that the
subject-to-tax exception “applie[d] on a post-apportionment, rather
than a pre-apportionment, basis”; “the subject-to-tax exception applies only to the extent that the royalty payments were actually
taxed by another state.” 130
The Supreme Court of Virginia also addressed an alternative argument put forward by Kohl’s, which the circuit court did not address in its decision. The Tax Department had allowed Kohl’s “a
partial exception to the add back statute to the extent that the royalty payments were apportioned and taxed in many of the Separate
Return States.” 131 However, the royalty payments had also been
included in combined filing states’ taxable income calculations,
where the Kohl’s affiliate to which the royalties were paid was included in the combined group. 132 The Department of Taxation required Kohl’s to add the royalties back to its taxable income for
these other states with add back statutes (Connecticut, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Georgia, and New Jersey). 133 Kohl’s argued that,
even if the subject-to-tax exception applied on a post-apportionment basis, the Department of Taxation had erred in calculating

126. Id. at 186, 810 S.E.2d at 896.
127. Id. at 189–90, 810 S.E.2d at 899.
128. Id. at 190, 810 S.E.2d at 899.
129. Id. at 190, 810 S.E.2d at 899.
130. Id. at 190, 810 S.E.2d at 899.
131. Id. at 190, 810 S.E.2d at 899.
132. See id. at 190, 810 S.E.2d at 899.
133. See id. at 190, 810 S.E.2d at 899.
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the amount of the royalties that would fall within the exception.
Kohl’s contended that “to the extent the royalties were apportioned
to and taxed by all of the [add back] states, they fall within the
subject-to-tax exception.” 134
The Department of Taxation countered that the court can only
look to the tax returns of Kohl’s affiliate when determining
whether the royalty payments were subject to a tax in another
state. 135 In other words, “for the royalty payments to fall within the
subject-to-tax exception, the tax must have been paid by the related member.” 136 The Department of Taxation based this argument on the reasoning that “the add back statute only applies to
any intangible expenses paid to a ‘related member,’ and that the
subject-to-tax exception only applies to ‘[t]he corresponding item of
income received by the related member.’” 137
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the Department
of Taxation and held that the statute only requires that the item
of income received by the related member, in this case, the royalties, be taxed by another state; it does not require that the related
member be the entity that pays the tax on the item of income. 138 In
short, the court held that “[t]o the extent that the royalties were
actually taxed by the Separate Return States, Combined Return
States, or Addback States, they fall within the subject-to-tax exception regardless of which entity paid the tax.” 139 The Supreme
Court of Virginia remanded the case back to the circuit court “for
a determination of what portion of the royalty payments [were] actually taxed by another state and, therefore, excepted from the add
back statute.” 140

134. Id. at 191, 810 S.E.2d at 899.
135. Id. at 191, 810 S.E.2d at 900.
136. Id. at 191, 810 S.E.2d at 900.
137. Id. at 191, 810 S.E.2d at 900 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-402(B)(8)(1) (Cum.
Supp. 2017)).
138. Id. at 191, 810 S.E.2d at 900 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-402 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
139. Id. at 191, 810 S.E.2d at 900.
140. Id. at 191, 810 at S.E.2d at 900. Kohl’s filed a petition for rehearing with the Supreme Court of Virginia, asserting that the court incorrectly relied on the Department of
Taxation’s interpretation in its original opinion. Petition for Rehearing at 1, Kohl’s Dep’t
Stores, Inc. v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 294 Va. 57, 803 S.E.2d 336 (2017) (No. 160681). The
Supreme Court of Virginia agreed and granted the petition for rehearing and issued a revised opinion (discussed above) in which the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed that the
subject-to-tax exception applies on a post-apportionment basis and only to the extent that
the royalty payments are actually taxed in another state. Kohl’s, 295 Va. 177, 810 S.E.2d
891. A comparison of the two majority opinions reflects that the court removed its previous
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A strong and well-reasoned dissenting opinion joined by three
justices refuted the court’s holding that Virginia Code section 58.1402(B)(8)(a)(1) applies on a post-apportionment, rather than a preapportionment basis. 141 The dissenting justices asserted that the
court “inserted an apportionment calculation into this provision
that is not supported by the provision’s plain language.” 142 In so
holding, the dissenting Justices agreed that Kohl’s was entitled to
a full refund and would have reversed the circuit court’s judgment. 143
However, perhaps more important to Virginia practitioners, the
dissenting justices accused the court of “revers[ing] more than a
century of Virginia law” by “abandon[ing] Virginia’s well-settled
strict-construction canon resolving ambiguities in tax statutes in
favor of the taxpayer to divine the true legislative intent of the
statute.” 144 Even if the dissenting Justices agreed with the majority that Virginia Code section 58.1-402(B)(8)(a)(1) is ambiguous,
they “would nevertheless resolve any ambiguity in favor of
Kohl’s.” 145
b. Corporate Executive Board v. Virginia Department of Taxation
The Arlington County Circuit Court held that Virginia’s cost-ofperformance statutory method to apportion income generated from
the sales of a company’s subscription-based services is not unconstitutional, and that companies are not entitled to use an alternative apportionment method. 146 The taxpayer, Corporate Executive
Board (“CEB”) is a multinational corporation headquartered in Arlington, Virginia. 147 Over 1400 CEB employees are based in Arlington, comprising the bulk of its employees company-wide. 148 CEB’s
web-based primary subscription product service is known as its

discussion on the weight it originally assigned to the Department of Taxation’s interpretations. Id. at 177, 810 S.E.2d at 891; see also Kohl’s, 294 Va. 57, 803 S.E.2d 336.
141. Kohl’s, 295 Va. at 192–93, 810 S.E.2d at 900–01 (McClanahan, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 193, 810 S.E.2d at 901.
143. Id. at 201, 810 S.E.2d at 905.
144. Id. at 193, 810 S.E.2d at 901.
145. Id. at 196, 810 S.E.2d at 903.
146. Corp. Exec. Bd. v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 96 Va. Cir. 287, 300–01 (2017) (Arlington
County).
147. Id. at 290.
148. Id.
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Core Product. 149 The Core Product is an annual fixed-fee subscription service that includes online access to information and data
services content. 150 CEB’s bundled product includes “best practices
research, executive education, and networking events, in addition
to tools used by executives to analyze business functions and processes.” 151
According to CEB, “nearly all of its costs of performance are incurred at its Rosslyn[ ] Arlington County headquarters rather than
where its customers are located.” 152 At its headquarters, “CEB received, analyzed, and disseminated business practices for its global
client network, and, at that location, created, developed, and improved the data and information it sold.” 153 “Customers, whether
local, national, or international, could access CEB’s servers that
were managed and controlled by CEB’s Information Technology
function, also located at CEB’s headquarters.” 154 Even if a CEB
“customer does not use the product, CEB still realized a sale.” 155
This case called into question Virginia’s corporate income apportionment system for companies that have multistate operations,
requiring their income to be apportioned among multiple states.
Virginia’s statutory apportionment of corporate income for tax liability is governed by Virginia Code section 58.1-408. 156 This statute
determines Virginia “tax liability on income generated by a corporation [to be] apportioned by use of a formula involving [(1)] the
value of the corporation’s property, real and tangible personal
property, located in Virginia in relation to all such property, [(2)]
paid or accrued payroll in Virginia in relation to all such payroll,
and [(3)] sales (which is double-weighted).” 157
“The dispute in this case concerns CEB’s sales that were allocated to Virginia when calculating what is termed the sales factor
of income apportionment to a corporate taxpayer who conducts
multi-state business.” 158 Virginia calculates the sales factor using

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 290–91.
See id. at 290.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 287 (discussing VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-408 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
Id.
Id.
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a division function, “the numerator of which is the total sales of the
corporation in [Virginia] during the taxable year, and the denominator of which is the total sales of the corporation everywhere during the taxable year.” 159 When a business generates income as a
result of actions performed in Virginia and other states, “gross receipts are allocated to Virginia if a greater portion of the incomeproducing activity is performed in Virginia than in any other state,
based on costs of performance.” 160
CEB sought an adjustment to how the sales factor was computed
as to its sales because fewer than 6% of its customers were billed
at a Virginia address. 161 CEB proposed an alternative method of
allocation to evaluate its income-producing activities, that of “destination-based sourcing”; the Department of Taxation denied this
request and the present litigation ensued. 162
CEB argued that its gross receipts or sales should be sourced
based on its customers’ billing addresses (i.e., customers’ zip codes)
because the statutory apportionment method, as applied, resulted
in a tax on income generated outside Virginia’s borders, thereby
violating the United States Constitution. 163 The trial court disagreed, finding that CEB failed to prove that its income attributed
to Virginia under the statutory method was all out of proportion
with its Virginia activities, or that the statutory apportionment
method led to a grossly distorted result. 164 The court held that use
of the zip codes as the sales apportionment factor “would lead to an
arbitrary result.” 165 The court stated that “[t]here is no direct evidence or reasonable inference that using a customer’s zip code negates the type or extent of business CEB conducted within Virginia
in relation to its income or to generate its income.” 166
The circuit court further dismissed CEB’s arguments that Virginia’s four-factor apportionment method was unconstitutional,
telling CEB that a “taxpayer who attacks a state’s apportionment
as unconstitutional must prove by clear and cogent evidence that
it results in extraterritorial values being taxed” and that CEB
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 287–88 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-414 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
Id. at 288 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-416 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
Id. at 291.
Id. at 289.
See id. at 291, 293.
See id. at 297.
Id.
Id.
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failed to meet its burden of proof to show that using Virginia’s apportionment formula leads to a “grossly distorted result.” 167 The
circuit court noted that Virginia did not tax benefits created or generated in other states:
The record demonstrates that CEB realized income from customers
who paid CEB’s subscription fee for data and information, but who
would not necessarily have to access that data and information, which
is relevant to the finding that the income-producing activity is more
directly determined by the location at which the data and information
were created, developed, and improved, or even stored, to wit Virginia,
and not where the customer is located. 168

The court also dismissed CEB’s argument that the State Tax Commissioner “acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner” when denying CEB’s request to use a different sales apportionment method. 169
CEB filed a petition for appeal with the Supreme Court of Virginia on December 8, 2017. 170 The supreme court granted CEB an
appeal on May 9, 2018. 171
2. Land Preservation Tax Credits for Individuals and
Corporations: Woolford v. Virginia Department of Taxation
In an opinion that may have far-reaching implications for how
tax appraisals and audits of land preservation tax credits are performed in Virginia, the Supreme Court of Virginia unanimously
reversed an entry of summary judgment in favor of the Virginia
Department of Taxation. 172 The dispute involved the granting of
Virginia Land Preservation Tax Credits based on the placement of
a conservation easement. 173 At issue were $4.9 million in income
tax credits that were purchased and later transferred to 168 transferees. 174 The Department of Taxation asserted that the appraiser
who valued the land at issue was not qualified and that the tax

167. Id. at 294–95, 297.
168. Id. at 299.
169. Id.
170. Corp. Exec. Bd. v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 97 Va. Cir. 287 (Arlington County), appeal
docketed, No. 171627 (Va. Dec. 2017).
171. Id.
172. Woolford v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 294 Va. 377, 391, 806 S.E.2d 398, 400 (2017).
173. Id. at 382, 806 S.E.2d at 400.
174. Id. at 382, 806 S.E.2d at 400–01.
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credits were invalid. 175 The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment in favor of the Department of Taxation. 176
The Woolfords owned a 450-acre farm in King William County
(“Property”) that had been in the family for over 160 years. 177 The
Property had valuable sand and gravel deposits beneath the surface. 178 The Woolfords engaged Michael Simerlein, a licensed General Real Estate Appraiser, licensed by the Virginia Real Estate
Appraiser Board, to value the Property before deciding whether to
pursue a conservation easement. 179 Simerlein valued the Property
“at $13.5 million without a land preservation easement, and at
$1,070,000 with a conservation easement, a reduction in value of
$12,430,000.” 180 This amount constituted the value of the donation
when the easement was conveyed to the Virginia Outdoors Foundation (“VOF”), an agency of Virginia that is eligible to hold conservation easements under the Virginia Land Conservation Incentives Act of 1999 (the “Act”). 181 Under the Act, taxpayers can obtain
tax credits equal to 40% of the fair market value of any “qualified
donation” to an eligible conservation agency, including the Commonwealth or an instrumentality thereof. 182 The VOF, as a public
conservation agency, qualifies as an eligible instrumentality of the
Commonwealth. 183
The Woolfords donated the conservation easement to the VOF
on November 11, 2011. 184 “The easement, which encumber[ed] the
entire [P]roperty, prohibit[ed] the Woolfords from mining the sand
and gravel on the [P]roperty.” 185 Simerlein had earlier informed
the Woolfords that the “value of the land overwhelmingly rested in
as yet unmined sand and gravel deposits.” 186 At the time the Woolfords put the easement on the Property, they “obtained a special
use permit from [King William] County and an active state permit

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 382–83, 806, S.E.2d at 401.
Id. at 384, 806 S.E.2d at 402.
Id. at 381, 806 S.E.2d at 400.
Id. at 381, 806 S.E.2d at 400.
Id. at 381, 806 S.E.2d at 400.
Id. at 381, 806 S.E.2d at 400.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-510 to -513 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
Id. § 58.1-512(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
Woolford, 294 Va. at 382, 806 S.E.2d at 400.
See id. at 382, 806 S.E.2d at 400.
Id. at 382, 806 S.E.2d at 400.
Id. at 381, 806 S.E.2d at 400.
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through the Virginia Department of Mines, Minerals and Energy.” 187 The permit, however, was limited to five acres which was
not being actively mined. 188 The Woolfords then applied for land
preservation tax credits, and on January 10, 2012, the Department
of Taxation awarded a tax credit for $4,972,000 based on Simerlein’s appraisal. 189 The Woolfords then transferred the credits to
168 transferees. 190
About one year later, the Department of Taxation informed the
Woolfords that there were material deficiencies that rendered the
Simerlein appraisal unreliable. 191 The Woolfords met with the Department of Taxation and also provided a second appraisal in an
attempt to resolve the dispute, but no resolution was reached and
this litigation ensued. 192
The primary scope of the trial concerned Mr. Simerlein’s qualifications as an appraiser. “In addition to being licensed by Virginia
as a real estate appraiser, [he also held] a master’s degree in real
estate appraisal and investment analysis, . . . [having] appraised
commercial and residential properties since 1992, . . . [including]
approximately 100 conservation easement donations.” 193 Simerlein
also appraised four properties involving sand and gravel mines, either by himself or in conjunction with other appraisers. 194 Simerlein acknowledged in his trial testimony that he had taken no
“coursework on the subject of mineral appraisals.” 195 At trial, the
court discounted Simerlein’s experience and lack of formal training
in mining appraisals, and granted summary judgment to the Department of Taxation. 196
In its review of Virginia Code sections 58.1-512(B) and 58.1512.1, the Supreme Court of Virginia noted that the legislature had
incorporated the federal law and regulations explaining what constitutes a “qualified appraiser.” 197 The court noted that there are

187. Id. at 381, 806 S.E.2d at 400.
188. See id. at 381, 806 S.E.2d at 400.
189. See id. at 381, 806 S.E.2d at 400.
190. Id. at 382, 806 S.E.2d at 401.
191. See id. at 382, 806 S.E.2d at 401.
192. Id. at 382–83, 806 S.E.2d at 401.
193. Id. at 383, 806 S.E.2d at 401.
194. Id. at 383, 806 S.E.2d at 401.
195. Id. at 383, 806 S.E.2d at 401.
196. Id. at 384, 806 S.E.2d at 402.
197. Id. at 385–86, 806 S.E.2d at 401 (citing I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(E)(ii)–(iii) (2012)).
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several requirements an appraiser must meet to be qualified. First,
an appraiser must have “earned an appraisal designation from a
recognized professional appraiser organization.” 198 An appraiser
must also “demonstrate[] verifiable education and experience in
valuing the type of property subject to the appraisal.” 199 The court
noted that Simerlein had experience in prior appraisals valuing
properties containing sand and gravel deposits, which provided relevant experience and learning. 200 Additionally, Simerlein had consulted colleagues and other professionals in the industry, demonstrating “considerable effort in learning about sand and gravel
mines in general and about the local and regional market for those
products.” 201 The court concluded Simerlein was a qualified appraiser within the meaning of Virginia Code section 58.1-512(B). 202
The Supreme Court of Virginia also addressed the Woolfords’ argument that the Department of Taxation could not challenge the
Simerlein appraisal after it had earlier accepted it and awarded
the tax credits accordingly. 203 In support of their argument, the
Woolfords pointed to Virginia Code section 58.1-512(D)(4)(a),
which specifies that:
If within 30 days after an application for credits has been filed the Tax
Commissioner provides written notice to the donor that he has determined that the preparation of a second qualified appraisal is warranted, the application shall not be deemed complete until the fair
market value of the donation has been finally determined by the Tax
Commissioner. 204

The Woolfords argued that the Department of Taxation made no
such determination within thirty days of its receipt of the Woolford’s tax credit application, so the Department of Taxation was
“forever barred from challenging the appraisal.” 205 The Supreme
Court of Virginia disagreed, noting that Virginia Code section 58.1512(D)(4)(a) “deals with the [Tax] Commissioner’s initial acceptance of an application for tax credits, not the Commissioner’s

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
2017)).
205.

Id. at 386, 806 S.E.2d at 401 (quoting I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(E)(iii) (2012)).
Id. at 386–87, 806 S.E.2d at 403 (quoting I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(E)(ii) (2012)).
Id. at 387–88, 806 S.E.2d at 403.
Id. at 388, 806 S.E.2d at 403–04.
Id. at 388, 806 S.E.2d at 404.
Id. at 388, 806 S.E.2d at 404.
Id. at 388, 806 S.E.2d at 404 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-512(D)(4)(a) (Repl. Vol.
Id. at 388, 806 S.E.2d at 404.
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authority to later audit the value of the tax credits.” 206 The court
reasoned, “[t]his provision of the statute does not by its plain terms
or by implication foreclose a subsequent audit by the Commissioner of the appraisal or of the claimed value of the tax credit.” 207
The court also addressed what it called the Department of Taxation’s “striking position,” namely, that the Woolfords were entitled to nothing for their donation; “unless the Department [of Taxation] concludes in good faith based on the evidence that the value
of the easement is zero, it must award the Woolfords tax credits for
the fair market value of the donation.” 208 The court remanded the
case back for further proceedings consistent with the supreme
court’s opinion. 209
II. TAXES ADMINISTERED BY LOCALITIES
A. Significant Legislative Activity
1. Real Estate Taxation
In 2018, the Virginia General Assembly adopted a number of
provisions affecting the taxation of real estate. Some involved valuation, while others impacted exemptions and deferred taxes.
a. Valuation of Community Land Trust Property
The General Assembly adopted a provision regarding valuation,
requiring assessors to consider certain unique factors and use a
single methodology in determining the fair market value “of structural improvements conveyed by a community land trust,” subject
to certain restrictions, including long-term ground leases with options to repurchase at set prices. 210 The stated purpose of these
changes was to ensure that the properties remain affordable to less
affluent families in the area. 211

206. Id. at 388–89, 806 S.E.2d at 404.
207. Id. at 389, 806 S.E.2d at 404.
208. Id. at 391, 806 S.E.2d at 405.
209. Id. at 391, 806 S.E.2d at 405.
210. Act of Mar. 23, 2018, ch. 436, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.13295.2 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
211. See id. ch. 436, 2018 Va. Acts at __.
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The factors that must be considered (notwithstanding any other
provision of law) are: (1) duly recorded ground leases or memoranda imposing restrictions on the price at which the improvements may be sold; and (2) a deed of trust or leasehold deed of trust
on the improvements or underlying real property that shows (a)
the amount of debt incurred by the improvement’s owner, (b) that
the deed of trust does not earn interest, and (c) that the deed of
trust need not be repaid prior to satisfaction of any interest-earning promissory note or a subsequent transfer of the property. 212
The methodology that must be used is “the income approach,”
applied in light of “the property’s current use, the contract rent,
the income restrictions, and provisions of any arms-length contract, including restrictions on the transfer of title or other restraints on the alienation of the real property.” 213
The provisions regarding valuation of land under new Virginia
Code section 58.1-3295.2 are similar to those applicable to real
property operated as “affordable rental housing.” 214
b. Classifying Real Estate as Devoted to Agricultural or
Horticultural Use
Although apparently a classification statute, the amendments to
Virginia Code sections 58.1-3230, 58.1-3231, and 58.1-3234 215 expand the number of properties that may be subjected to use value
assessment and taxation by local ordinance. 216 Under current law,
when application is duly made by the land owner 217 and the special
use validated, 218 the locality “shall consider only those indicia of
value which such real estate has for agricultural, horticultural, forest or open space use” when assessing and taxing the real estate. 219
In 2018, the General Assembly expanded the potential application of use valuation by revising two definitions. The first, “[r]eal

212. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3295.2(A)(1)–(2) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
213. Id. § 58.1-3295.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
214. Compare id. § 58.1-3295(A) (Cum. Supp. 2018), with id. § 15.2-2305 (Repl. Vol.
2018).
215. Act of Mar. 29, 2018, ch. 504, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 58.1-3230 to -3231, -3234 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
216. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3231 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
217. Id. § 58.1-3234 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
218. Id. § 58.1-3233 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
219. Id. § 58.1-3236 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
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estate devoted to agricultural use,” has been revised to include not
only “real estate devoted to the bona fide production for sale of
plants and animals,” but also devoted to the production of “products made from such plants and animals on the real estate, that
are useful to man or devoted to and meeting the requirements and
qualifications for payments or other compensation pursuant to soil
and water conservation programs under an agreement with an
agency of the state or federal government.” 220 Second, “[r]eal estate
devoted to horticultural use” has been revised to include not only
“real estate devoted to the bona fide production for sale of fruits of
all kinds, including grapes, nuts, and berries; vegetables; nursery
and floral products,” but also land devoted to the bona fide production of:
plants or products directly produced from fruits, vegetables, nursery
and floral products, or plants on such real estate, [and] devoted to and
meeting the requirements and qualifications for payments or other
compensation pursuant to a soil and water conservation program under an agreement with an agency of the state or federal government
under uniform standards . . . . 221

Besides expanding these definitions, the Virginia General Assembly also made several statutory changes to allow land owners
to meet the uniform standards for classification under the four
qualifying uses sooner, and to hold on to the classification longer.
One change provided that any requirement under the uniform
standards that the real estate has “been used for a particular purpose for a minimum length of time before qualifying as real estate
devoted to agricultural use or horticultural use” must count the
time in which there was “use of other similar property by a lessee
of the owner.” 222 Another change required the uniform standards
to allow for a shorter minimum length of time for qualification of
real estate if “the owner submits a written document of the owner’s
intent regarding use of the real estate containing elements set out
in the uniform standards.” 223 The last change permitted localities
to allow validation of the qualifying land use to be shown every six
years, rather than annually. 224

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. § 58.1-3230 (Cum. Supp. 2018).
Id.
Id. § 58.1-3231 (Cum. Supp. 2018).
Id.
Id. § 58.1-3234 (Cum. Supp. 2018).
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c. Nonqualified Transfer Triggers Payment of Deferred Real
Estate Taxes
Localities have been authorized to provide for the exemption
from tax and/or a deferral of payment of real estate tax on the sole
dwelling of persons aged sixty-five or older or those “found to be
permanently and totally disabled.” 225 The law, prior to recent
amendment, was that in the case of deferrals, “the accumulated
amount of taxes deferred shall be paid to” the locality, either “upon
the sale of the dwelling, or from the estate of the decedent within
one year after the death of the last owner thereof who qualifies for
tax deferral.” 226 The amount of deferred taxes, along with any interest provided by ordinance, up to 8% per annum, “shall constitute
a lien upon” the property for which taxes were deferred, but may
be paid without penalty. 227
In 2018, the Virginia General Assembly clarified that not only
sale of the real estate, or death of the “qualified owner,” 228 but also
“a nonqualified transfer of the real estate” would trigger payment
of deferred taxes. 229 Now, the property may be transferred without
triggering the payment of deferred taxes (1) to a spouse; (2) to a
revocable inter vivos trust over which the qualified owner, or the
qualified owner and his spouse, hold the power of revocation; (3) or
to an irrevocable trust under which a qualified owner alone or in
conjunction with his spouse possesses a life estate or an estate for
joint lives, or enjoys a continuing right of use or support. 230
2. Personal Property Tax
a. New Valuation Class of Tangible Personal Property:
Computer Equipment and Peripherals Used in a Data Center
In 2013, the Virginia General Assembly amended Virginia Code
section 58.1-3506 to make “[c]omputer equipment and peripherals

225. Id. § 58.1-3210 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
226. Id. § 58.1-3216 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
227. Id.
228. See id. § 58.1-3216(A) (Cum. Supp. 2018) (defining “[q]ualified owner” as “the owner
of the real property who qualifies for a tax deferral by county, city, or town ordinance”).
229. Act of Mar. 9, 2018, ch. 291, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-3216 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
230. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3216(A) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
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used in a data center” a separate class of tangible personal property, for rate purposes, that is subject to local taxation. 231 However,
it was not made a separate class “for valuation purposes” under
Virginia Code section 58.1-3503(A). 232 In 2018, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 58.1-3503 to add subsection
(A)(17), covering “[c]omputer equipment and peripherals used in a
data center, as defined in” Virginia Code section 58.1-3506
(A)(43). 233 This new class of property “shall be valued by means of
a percentage or percentages of original cost, or by such other
method as may reasonably be expected to determine the actual fair
market value.” 234
b. Reducing Tax Exemptions of Large Solar Energy Generators
In 2018, the General Assembly amended the provision separately classifying and providing for partial or total exemption from
state and local taxation of “[c]ertified pollution control equipment
and facilities,” removing the exemption for certain larger “solar
photovoltaic (electric energy) systems,” i.e., solar panel farms. 235
Since 2014, “certified pollution control equipment” has been expressly defined to include “solar energy equipment, facilities, or devices owned or operated by a business that collect[s], generate[s],
transfer[s], or store[s] thermal or electric energy,” as well as “solar
photovoltaic (electric energy) systems.” 236 At that time, the exemption for solar panels “applie[d] only to projects equaling 20 megawatts or less, as measured in alternating current (AC) generation
capacity.” 237 In 2016, subsection (B) of Virginia Code section 58.13660 exemption for solar panel farms was modified to include additional conditions related to when a given farm joined the electric
grid and the size of the facility. 238 Among the additional conditions
231. Act of Mar. 14, 2013, ch. 393, 2013 Va. Acts 646, 649 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-3506 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
232. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3503(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
233. Act of Mar. 9, 2018, ch. 292, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 58.1-3503, -3506 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
234. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3503(A)(17) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
235. Act of Apr. 18, 2018, ch. 849, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-3660 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
236. Act of Apr. 6, 2014, ch. 737, 2014 Va. Acts 1308, 1308–09 (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3660 to -3661 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
237. Id. ch. 737, 2014 Va. Acts at 1308–09.
238. Act of Mar. 11, 2016, ch. 346, 2016 Va. Acts 634, 636–37 (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-609.3, -3660 to -3661 (Cum. Supp. 2016)).
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was the adoption of an 80% exemption of the assessed value of projects greater than twenty megawatts “for which an initial interconnection request form has been filed with an electric utility or a regional transmission organization after January 1, 2015 . . . for
projects first in service on or after January 1, 2017.” 239 A similar
80% exemption of “the assessed value of all other projects equaling
more than 5 megawatts, as measured in alternating current (AC)
generation capacity for which an initial interconnection request
form has been filed with an electric utility or a regional transmission organization on or after January 1, 2019,” was also adopted. 240
The 2018 amendment to subsection (B) of Virginia Code section
58.1-3660 241 retained the exemption for 80% of the assessed value
of projects greater than twenty megawatts “for which an initial interconnection request form has been filed with an electric utility or
a regional transmission organization [] between January 1, 2015
and June 30, 2018.” 242 That amendment, however, eliminated the
exemption for projects of 150 megawatts or more that filed an initial interconnection request form “on or after July 1, 2018” and
were “first in service on or after January 1, 2017.” 243 And the
amendment also limited the 80% exemption for “all other projects”
of 150 megawatts or more that “[filed] an initial interconnection
request form . . . on or after January 1, 2019.” 244
c. Exemption of Leaseholds Owned by Land Bank Entities
In adopting the Land Bank Entities Act in 2016, 245 the Virginia
General Assembly adopted Virginia Code section 15.2-7510, which
exempted land bank entities from having “to pay any taxes upon
any property acquired or used by the land bank entity under the
provisions of the Act.” 246 The exempt status flows from the public

239. Id. ch. 346, 2016 Va. Acts at 636–37.
240. Id. ch. 346, 2016 Va. Acts at 636–37.
241. Act of Apr. 18, 2018, ch. 849, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-3660 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
242. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3660(B) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Act of Mar. 11, 2016, ch. 383, 2016 Va. Acts 669, 669–72 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 15.2-7500, -7512, -3970.2 (Cum. Supp. 2016)); Act of Mar. 1, 2016, ch. 159, 2016 Va. Acts
282, 282–86 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.2-7500 to -7512, -3970.2 (Cum.
Supp. 2016)).
246. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-7510 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
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purpose and function of such entities, which are created by localities “for the purpose of assisting the locality to address vacant,
abandoned, and tax delinquent properties.” 247
In 2018, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
58.1-3203, a section concerning the taxation of leasehold interests,
adding subsection (C) that provides “[w]hen any real property is
exempt from taxation under § 15.2-7510, the leasehold interest in
the property shall also be exempt from taxation.” 248
d. Property of LLC with Nonprofit Single Member May Be
Exempted
By statute, localities are authorized to adopt, by ordinance of the
governing body, various designations or classifications of property
that are “exempt from real or personal property taxes, or both . . .
[and the real or personal] property, or both, owned by a nonprofit
organization” and used for certain identified purposes. 249 In 2018,
the General Assembly adopted a clarifying amendment, 250 providing expressly that such “nonprofit organization[s] includ[e] a single
member limited liability company whose sole member is a nonprofit organization.” 251 This amendment addresses a common situation, generated by liability or other corporate structuring concerns, in which nonprofits hold property through various LLCs,
which are not themselves recognized nonprofits and so may be
challenged when they claim exemption.
e. Exempt Agricultural Products Defined
Virginia Code section 58.1-3505 exempts “agricultural products”
from taxation “while in the hands of a producer.” 252 In 2018, the
General Assembly clarified subsection (A)’s exemption by defining
“agricultural product” as “any livestock, aquaculture, poultry, horticultural, floricultural, viticulture, silvicultural, or other farm
crops,” a definition borrowed from Virginia Code section 3.2247. Id. § 15.2-7501(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
248. Act of Mar. 23, 2018, ch. 437, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-3203 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
249. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3651(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
250. Act of Feb. 26, 2018, ch. 29, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-3651(A) (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
251. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3651(A) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
252. Id. § 58.1-3505(C) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
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6400. 253 The General Assembly further clarified that the exemption was only from the taxes imposed under chapter 35 of title 58.1,
which involves the tangible personal property tax and merchants’
capital tax, among others. 254
3. Merchants’ Capital Tax: New Class of Merchants’ Capital for
Warehoused Inventory
Localities may impose a tax upon the separate class of property
known as merchants’ capital. 255 Merchants’ capital is separately
defined to embrace inventory and tangible personal property offered for sale. 256 Prior to 2018, some statutory exceptions to the
generally applicable definition have been made, 257 as well as a separate classification for the inventory of pharmaceutical wholesalers. 258
In 2018, the General Assembly added another separate classification, this time embracing “[m]erchants’ capital of any wholesaler
reported as inventory that is located, and is normally located, in a
structure that contains at least 100,000 square feet, with at least
100,000 square feet used solely to store such inventory.” 259 As with
pharmaceutical wholesalers, localities are authorized by new Virginia Code section 58.1-3510.02 to “levy a tax on such inventory at
different rates from the tax levied on other merchants’ capital” although “[t]he rates of tax and the rates of assessment shall not exceed that applicable generally to merchants’ capital.” 260

253. Act of Mar. 30, 2018, ch. 618, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-3505 (Cum. Supp. 2018)) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 3.2-6400 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
254. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3505(C) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
255. Id. § 58.1-3509 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
256. Id. § 58.1-3510(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017) (defining “merchants’ capital” as “[i]nventory of
stock on hand; daily rental vehicles as defined in § 58.1-1735; and all other taxable personal
property of any kind whatsoever, except money on hand and on deposit and except tangible
personal property not offered for sale as merchandise”).
257. See id. § 58.1-3510(B)–(C) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
258. In 1997, pharmaceutical wholesalers’ inventory were separately classed from other
merchants’ capital, and the rates of tax and the rates of assessment were capped at the
amount “applicable generally to merchants’ capital” in the locality. Act of Mar. 2, 1997, ch.
71, 1997 Va. Acts 99, 99 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3510.01 (Cum. Supp. 1997)).
259. Act of Feb. 26, 2018, ch. 23, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.13510.02 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
260. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3510.02 (Cum. Supp. 2018).
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4. Disclosure of Confidential Taxpayer Information to Localities’
Third-Party Contractors
Virginia Code section 58.1-3 generally prohibits disclosure or
dissemination by the Tax Commissioner, local taxing authorities,
or their agents of any information acquired in the performance of
their duties that relate “to the transactions, property, including
personal property, income or business of any person, firm or corporation.” 261 Violation of this provision is a Class 1 misdemeanor, 262
which carries a penalty of “confinement in jail for not more than
twelve months and a fine of not more than $2,500, either or
both.” 263 There are a number of limited exceptions to this prohibition contained in Virginia Code section 58.1-3, 264 and some exceptions in other sections of the Code, such as the provision for disclosure in discovery for challenges to local assessments. 265 Among the
exceptions to the rule of nondisclosure in Virginia Code section
58.1-3 is one allowing the Department of Taxation to disclose “information to nongovernmental entities with which the Department
has entered into a contract to provide services that assist it in the
administration of refund processing or other services related to its
administration of taxes.” 266
In 2018, the General Assembly similarly authorized “the commissioner of the revenue, treasurer, director of finance, or other
similar local official who collects or administers taxes for a county,
city, or town” to disclose “information to nongovernmental entities
with which the locality has entered into a contract to provide services that assist it in the administration of refund processing or
other non-audit services related to its administration of taxes.” 267
It bears noting that the exception does not apply in favor of disclosure to a nongovernmental entity providing “non-audit services related to the administration of taxes,” a limitation not contained in
the exception for the Tax Commissioner. Also, unlike the exception
for the Tax Commissioner, these local tax collecting and adminis-

261. Id. § 58.1-3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
262. Id.
263. Id. § 18.2-11(a) (Repl. Vol. 2014).
264. See id. § 58.1-3(A)–(B) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
265. See, e.g., id. § 58.1-3984(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
266. Id. § 58.1-3(B)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
267. Act of Feb. 26, 2018, ch. 40, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-3 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
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tering officials are statutorily prohibited from “disclos[ing] information to such entity unless he has obtained a written acknowledgement by such entity that the confidentiality and nondisclosure
obligations of and penalties set forth in subsection A apply to such
entity and that such entity agrees to abide by such obligations.” 268
B. Significant Judicial Decisions
1. Business Professional Occupation and License Tax: Dulles
Duty Free, LLC v. County of Loudoun
The Supreme Court of Virginia found the imposition of the
Loudoun County Business Professional Occupation and License
(“BPOL”) gross receipts tax on the sale of duty-free items sold at
Dulles International Airport to be unconstitutional. 269 In reversing
the Loudoun County Circuit Court, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held in a unanimous decision, that Loudoun County’s BPOL tax on
Dulles Duty Free, LLC’s sales of duty-free goods to international
travelers violated the United States Constitution’s Import-Export
Clause, which prohibits states from imposing duties on exported
goods without express permission from Congress. 270
Dulles Duty Free, LLC (“Duty Free”) “is a duty-free retailer.” 271
During the relevant tax years at issue in this case, Duty Free operated multiple shops at Dulles International Airport in Loudoun
County, all of which were within security. 272 Duty Free sells alcohol, tobacco, luxury gifts, fragrances, and other goods. 273 Federal
law authorizes Duty Free’s shops, and the entire duty-free process
is highly regulated with significant federal oversight, primarily
through United States Customs and Border Protection. 274 By federal law, the term duty-free merchandise “means merchandise sold
by a duty-free sales enterprise on which neither Federal duty nor

268. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3(B)(5) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
269. Dulles Duty Free, LLC v. County of Loudoun, 294 Va. 9, 11, 803 S.E.2d 54, 55
(2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1440 (2018).
270. Id. at 23–24, 803 S.E.2d at 62. For a discussion of the Loudoun County Circuit Court
decision in this case, see Craig D. Bell & Emily J.S. Winbigler, Annual Survey of Virginia
Law: Taxation, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 79, 104–08 (2017).
271. Bell & Winbigler, supra note 270, at 104.
272. Id. at 104–05.
273. Dulles Duty Free, 294 Va. at 11, 803 S.E.2d at 55.
274. Id. at 11, 803 S.E. 2d at 55 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1555 (2012)). This federal statute
authorizes bonded duty free sales of merchandise for export. See § 1555.
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Federal tax has been assessed pending exportation from the customs territory.” 275 Duty Free must comply with 19 U.S.C. § 1555
and its implementing regulations in order to preserve its duty-free
status. 276
Duty Free’s goods, both imported and domestic, gather “in
bonded warehouses in Florida and Texas.” 277 Bonded carriers then
bring the goods to Duty Free’s secured warehouse located at Dulles
Airport “which, in turn, distributes the merchandise to [Duty
Free’s] retail stores inside the airport.” 278
The merchandise is sold in a restricted area of the airport. Only passengers with boarding passes may enter and these passengers must
first go through security. Duty Free can sell items to both domestic
and international passengers. For domestic travelers, Duty Free
charges a Virginia sales tax and the purchaser takes immediate possession of the item. When the sale involves a bonded imported item,
the domestic passenger pays an import duty. Duty Free does not challenge the imposition of the BPOL tax to such domestic sales. 279

International sales are handled differently. International travelers must show their passports and boarding passes to Duty Free’s
cashier, who rings up the sale without charging a sales tax, bags
the items, and accepts payment. 280 The cashier then places the
bagged goods in a cart for delivery to the jetway serving the purchaser’s flight, the traveler obtains a receipt, and a bonded dutyfree cartman meets the traveler at the jetway just prior to boarding
the plane. 281 The receipt-for-goods exchange thus occurs just prior
to the international passenger boarding the plane. 282 Under this
system, travelers receive their goods after the airline clears the
plane to have passengers board. 283 If, for any reason, the traveler
does not board the plane, she cannot collect the goods, and the cartman returns the unclaimed goods to Duty Free, which voids the

275. § 1555(b)(8)(E).
276. Id. § 1555.
277. Dulles Duty Free, 249 Va. at 11, 803 S.E.2d at 55.
278. Id. at 11, 803 S.E. 2d at 55.
279. Id. at 11, 803 S.E. 2d at 55.
280. See id. at 12, 803 S.E. 2d at 55.
281. Id. at 12, 803 S.E. 2d at 55.
282. Id. at 12, 803 S.E.2d at 55.
283. Id. at 12, 803 S.E. 2d at 55 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1555(b)(3)(F)(i)(II) (2012)). This provision requires duty free merchandise to be delivered to the international traveler-purchasers at the exit point of a specific departing flight. See 1555(b)(3)(F)(i)(II).
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sale. 284 In this manner Duty Free ensures that the items sold for
export are in fact for export.
Duty Free tracks which sales are domestic and which sales are
international, and for the tax years at issue in the case, international sales for export amounted to between 92% and 99.8% of Duty
Free’s total sales. 285
Loudoun County requires every person engaged in business in
the county to obtain a business license; Duty Free obtained a license for each of its stores located in Dulles Airport. 286 Loudoun
County’s BPOL tax was imposed on all of Duty Free’s gross receipts, domestic and international, for 2009 to 2013 (the tax years
at issue) at a rate of seventeen cents for every $100 in retail
sales. 287 Duty Free paid the BPOL taxes and sought a refund of the
BPOL taxes it paid on sales made for export to international travelers. 288 The circuit court issued a detailed letter opinion that “canvassed the cases from the United States Supreme Court and concluded that ‘the BPOL tax of Loudoun County [did] not violate the
Import Export Clause of the U.S. Constitution.’” 289 As a result of
its decision, the trial court denied Duty Free’s application for a refund. 290
The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that Duty Free sought “an
‘as applied’ challenge rather than a challenge to the facial constitutionality of the BPOL tax.” 291 The Import-Export Clause provides that “No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress,
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may
be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws.” 292 This
clause, “along with the Commerce Clause and the Export Clause,
was designed to suppress fratricidal trade policies and thus ‘provide for the harmony and proper intercourse among the States.’” 293

284. Dulles Duty Free, 294 Va. at 12, 803 S.E.2d at 55.
285. Id. at 12, 803 S.E.2d at 55; see Transcript of Record at 10, 255–58, 271–87, 457,
Dulles Duty Free, LLC v. County of Loudoun, Civil No. 90613, letter op. at 2 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Apr. 26, 2016) (Loudoun County) (unpublished decision) (on file with authors).
286. Dulles Duty Free, 294 Va. at 12, 803 S.E.2d at 56.
287. Id. at 13, 803 S.E.2d at 56.
288. Id. at 13, 803 S.E.2d at 56.
289. Id. at 13, 803 S.E.2d at 56.
290. Id. at 13, 803 S.E.2d at 56.
291. Id. at 13, 803 S.E.2d at 56.
292. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2.
293. Dulles Duty Free, 294 Va. at 14, 803 S.E.2d at 57. Justice McCullough went back to
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The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that “[r]esolution of the
constitutional propriety of the BPOL tax to Duty Free’s in-transit
export sales hinges on the applicability, and ongoing validity, of
the [United States Supreme Court] decision in Richfield Oil Corp.
v. State Bd. of Equalization.” 294 Duty Free argued that the holding
in Richfield Oil controlled. 295 Loudoun County “asserted that the
case [was] distinguishable or superseded by later decisions” of the
United States Supreme Court. 296
Richfield Oil had a contract with the government of New Zealand for the sale of oil, all of which was for export. 297 “California
assessed a retail sales tax against Richfield Oil that was ‘measured
by the gross receipts from the transaction.’ Richfield Oil argued
that the tax violated the Import-Export Clause and the [United
States] Supreme Court agreed.” 298 The California sales tax was an
excise tax for the privilege of conducting a retail business measured by the gross receipts from sales. 299 The United States Supreme Court, however, stated that “‘whether the tax deprives the
taxpayer of a federal right,’ . . . turns not on the characterization
of the tax under state law but, rather, on ‘its operation and effect.’” 300 The Court in Richfield Oil also quoted Chief Justice John
Marshall, who said that “a tax measured by the gross receipts of
sales is effectively a tax on the article itself.” 301
The United States Supreme Court in Richfield Oil also provided
that “[a] tax that effectively ‘add[s] to the price of the article, and
[is] paid by the consumer, or by the importer himself,’ such as a tax
‘on the occupation of an importer’ is in practical effect no different
from ‘a direct duty on the article itself.’” 302

the debates and papers from the 1787 Constitutional Convention, and in particular the Papers of James Madison on the debates in order to divine the genesis of the Import-Export
Clause. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 263 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
294. Dulles Duty Free, 294 Va. at 14, 803 S.E.2d at 57 (citing Richfield Oil Corp. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946)).
295. Dulles Duty Free, 294 Va. at 14–15, 803 S.E.2d at 57.
296. Id. at 15, 803 S.E.2d at 57.
297. Id. at 15, 803 S.E.2d at 57.
298. Id. at 15, 803 S.E.2d at 57 (quoting Richfield Oil, 329 U.S. at 71–72).
299. Id. at 15, 803 S.E.2d at 57.
300. Id. at 16, 803 S.E.2d at 57–58 (citing Richfield Oil, 329 U.S. at 84).
301. Id. at 16, 803 S.E.2d at 58 (citing Richfield Oil, 329 U.S. at 84 (quoting Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 444 (1827))).
302. Id. at 16, 803 S.E.2d at 58 (quoting Richfield Oil, 329 U.S. at 85).
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The Supreme Court of Virginia next examined developments
since the 1946 decision in Richfield Oil. The 1976 United States
Supreme Court decision in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages adopted a
policy-based test when evaluating a Georgia ad valorem inventory
tax on goods held in storage in a warehouse after completing their
international travels from France and Nova Scotia into Georgia
and while awaiting subsequent domestic transportation. 303 The
goods in Michelin Tire were no longer in-transit, and the United
States Supreme Court held the ad valorem tax was not an “impost”
or “duty,” and the Georgia ad valorem tax was nondiscriminatory
and “did not single out imports for taxation.” 304 The Supreme Court
of Virginia acknowledged that many “courts have struggled to determine which test to apply when it comes to assessing the constitutionality of taxes that fall on export goods in transit.” 305 In this
case, “[t]he bright line Richfield Oil test, rather than the policybased Michelin test, supplies the rule of decision.” 306
The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that
the [United States] Supreme Court has not overruled Richfield Oil
and, while it has significantly revised its Import-Export Clause jurisprudence, the Court has carefully carved out for future disposition the
issue [of] whether the Michelin test would apply to a non-discriminatory tax that falls on export goods in transit. 307

The United States Supreme Court also “has not retreated from its
method of assessing the constitutionality of a state tax based on its
operation and effect[;] [a] state’s characterization of the tax does
not control.” 308
The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that the Loudoun County
BPOL tax “is indistinguishable from the prohibited gross receipts
tax in Richfield Oil.” 309 Under that precedent, “a tax that falls directly on export goods in transit violates the [Import-Export]
Clause.” 310 Both California’s tax in Richfield Oil and the BPOL tax

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Dulles Duty Free, 294 Va. at 16, 803 S.E.2d at 58; see 423 U.S. 276, 278 (1976).
Dulles Duty Free, 294 Va. at 16, 803 S.E.2d at 58–59.
Id. at 21, 803 S.E.2d at 60.
Id. at 21, 803 S.E.2d at 60.
Id. at 22, 803 S.E.2d at 61.
Id. at 23, 803 S.E.2d at 61.
Id. at 23–24, 803 S.E.2d at 62.
Id. at 23, 803 S.E.2d at 62.
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are imposed on a percentage of gross sales, and are, in their operation and effect, direct taxes on exported goods in transit. 311 The
Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that “the BPOL tax as applied to
Duty Free’s export goods in transit constitutes an impermissible
impost upon an export in violation of the Import-Export Clause,”
and it reversed and remanded the case “for a determination of the
refund due to Duty Free.” 312
Loudoun County filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court on December 19, 2017. 313 Perhaps
the county sought to capitalize on Justice McCullough’s comment
in his opinion that perhaps “the United States Supreme Court will
provide additional guidance concerning the applicability of the Import-Export Clause to nondiscriminatory taxes like the BPOL tax
that would be imposed upon export goods in transit.” 314 Duty Free
filed its Respondent’s Brief on February 26, 2018, and the county
filed its Petitioner’s Reply on March 8, 2018. 315 The United States
Supreme Court denied Loudoun County’s petition on April 2,
2018. 316
2. Personal Property and Real Property Taxation of a Marine
Freight Container Terminal
In Virginia International Gateway, Inc. v. City of Portsmouth,
the Portsmouth City Circuit Court had to rule on both the taxpayer’s challenges of its real estate and personal property tax assessments, and a counterclaim by the City of Portsmouth seeking
an increase of the tax assessments. 317 The trial court ruled that
neither party presented credible expert testimony on real property
value, and rejected the owner’s calculation of fair market value for
high-tech terminal cranes for which no market currently exists. 318

311. Id. at 23–24, 803 S.E.2d at 62.
312. Id. at 24, 803 S.E.2d at 62.
313. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, County of Loudoun v. Dulles Duty Free, LLC, 138
S. Ct. 1440 (2018) (No. 17-904).
314. Dulles Duty Free, 294 Va. at 24, 803 S.E.2d at 62.
315. Brief in Opposition, County of Loudoun, 138 S. Ct. 1440 (No. 17-904); Petitioner’s
Reply to Brief in Opposition, County of Loudoun, 138 S. Ct. 1440 (No. 17-904).
316. Dulles Duty Free, LLC, 294 Va. 9, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1440.
317. Va. Int’l Gateway v. City of Portsmouth, Nos. CL15-2813, CL16-1427, 2018 Va. Cir.
LEXIS 69, at *1 (Mar. 22, 2018) (Portsmouth City).
318. Id. at *14–16.
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Virginia International Gateway, Inc. (“Gateway”) owned a large
tract of land in the City of Portsmouth, used as a “marine container
terminal and [at the time of the case] under long-term lease to the
Virginia Port Authority.” 319 Gateway challenged its real property
assessments for tax year 2016 and its personal property assessments for tax years 2015 and 2016. 320 Gateway engaged Glen
Fandl to appraise the real estate and serve as their expert witness;
Fandl had his real property license from New York, but he obtained
temporary Virginia appraisal licensure on two separate occasions. 321 Contemporaneously with the case, Fandl performed tax
consulting work on valuing the real property for a meeting with
the Portsmouth Commissioner of the Revenue, and again when
he prepared his written appraisal report. 322 Subsequently, when
Fandl testified at trial as a real property appraisal expert, his temporary Virginia appraisal license had lapsed. 323
The trial court noted that Fandl’s training and experience as a
state and local tax consultant was impressive; however, as a real
estate appraiser, his experience was less impressive “[and] seemingly an adjunct to his primary work of consulting.” 324 The court
did find Fandl’s experience and training sufficient to be qualified
as an expert to opine on valuations of real property over the City
of Portsmouth’s objections. 325 However, Portsmouth also objected
to Fandl as an appraiser on the grounds that “he violated Virginia
law by engaging in appraisal work . . . [and] presenting himself in
Court to testify as an expert witness after his temporary Virginia
license had expired.” 326 The requirement of a Virginia license in
real estate or real property appraisals is clear under Virginia Code
section 54.1-2011(A), which makes it unlawful to “engage in the
appraisal of real estate or real property for compensation or valuable consideration in this Commonwealth without first obtaining a
real estate appraiser license.” 327

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2–3.
Id.
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at n.1 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2011(A) (Repl. Vol. 2013)).
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The circuit court stated that trial judges must be “advers[e] to
exercising a power which will serve to promote illegal conduct.” 328
Accordingly, the trial judge decided that he should not have recognized Fandl as an expert in real estate values without a Virginia
license, and struck the entirety of Fandl’s testimony. 329
The circuit court then turned to Portsmouth’s counterclaim asserting a higher fair market value than the real property tax assessment. The court noted that the city’s appraiser, John Soscia,
had no prior experience in appraising a marine container terminal
and had relied heavily on other “experts” who did not appear as
trial witnesses. 330 Additionally, Soscia was not able to explain specialized reference resources relating to marine container terminals, made an $8,000,000 math error on several crane fixtures, did
not appraise specific individualized improvements, and valued the
complete terminal, consisting of 457 acres of developable land at
$375,000 per acre, even though only twenty-one of the acres abutted the river. 331 Soscia’s appraisal approach also failed to “take into
account the actual uses, to which the land [was] being employed
. . . .” 332 The court concluded Soscia’s valuation failed to establish
the fair market value of the real property, so the city did not meet
its burden of proof on its counterclaim. 333
On the personal property case, the court noted no appraiser license was required. 334 The court took note of Virginia Code section
58.1-3503(B), which permits the Portsmouth Commissioner of the
Revenue to assess the value of personal property by using a percentage of original cost. 335 When a percentage of the original cost
renders a value the taxpayer believes is greater than fair market
value, the Commissioner may reduce the value if presented with
credible and independent evidence (i.e., an appraisal). 336 Experts
for both parties testified “that there [was] no market in the world
for [used automated stacking cranes]” because they were new technology for which infrastructure was still rare. 337 The court held
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Id. at *4–5.
See id. at *5.
See id. at *5–6.
See id. at *8–10.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *10–12.
Id. at *12.
Id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3503(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
Va. Int’l Gateway, 2018 Va. Cir. at *12–13.
Id. at *14.
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Gateway was unable to meet its burden of proof that the personal
property assessment was erroneous, and the court “decline[d] to
make any adjustment to the subject assessment.” 338
CONCLUSION
The 2018 session of the Virginia General Assembly continued its
recent trend of addressing mostly targeted and technical changes
in the tax laws. However, Virginia’s judiciary has been active in
addressing a number of important issues on both state administered taxes as well as those administrated by localities. The resolution of Kohl’s Department Stores brings certainty to the battling
theories on how to interpret the subject-to-tax exception contained
in Virginia Code section 58.1-402(B)(8)(a)(1) to apply only to the
extent royalty taxes are actually taxes by another state. The Virginia Supreme Court in Woolford also provides needed guidance
that addresses the qualifications required to be a “qualified appraiser” within the meaning of Virginia Code sections 58.1-512(B)
and 58.1-512.1 when valuing property or conservation easement
transfers for purposes of obtaining tax credits under Virginia’s
Land Conservation Incentives Act of 1999.
As to Virginia local taxes, the Virginia Supreme Court in Dulles
Duty Free unanimously reversed a trial court decision to hold that
a locality’s imposition of its gross receipts BPOL tax on the sale of
duty-free items sold at Dulles International Airport to be unconstitutional, as a violation of the United States Constitution’s ImportExport Clause, which prohibits states from imposing duties on exported goods without permission from Congress. The Court set out
the standards of Federal Constitutional law when analyzing a
state tax statute on an as applied challenge to the constitutionality
of Virginia’s BPOL tax. The message of this article on recent developments in Virginia taxation is that an increasing number of court
cases are being decided, interpreting and resolving state and local
tax statutes while including informative guidance. Perhaps next
year we may be able to receive a similar level of guidance on legislative changes to Virginia’s Tax Code as opposed to those of a more
technical variety.

338.

Id. at *16.

